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1  | INTRODUC TION
Group narcissism is a phenomenon of the greatest po-
litical significance. Erich Fromm (1980; p. 51)
Inasmuch as the group as a whole requires group nar-
cissism for its survival, it will further narcissistic atti-
tudes and confer upon them the qualification of being 
particularly virtuous. Erich Fromm (1964; p. 80)
The full maturity of man is achieved by his complete 
emergence from narcissism both individual and group 
narcissism. Erich Fromm (1964; p. 90)
The present wave of populism has reorganized the political map 
of the world. Populist parties have become significant political play-
ers in many Western democracies (Brubaker, 2017). The central fea-
ture of populism is its anti-elitism that contrasts the “democratic will 
of the people” with the self-interested will of “elites.” Idolizing “the 
will of the people,” populism undermines the very idea of pluralis-
tic democracy, the rule of law, equality, and respect toward rights of 
all social groups (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Müller, 2017). 
Otherwise free of ideological content, populism can become at-
tached and “thickened” by any host ideology (Mudde, 2007; Mudde & 
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). An overwhelming majority of Western pop-
ulist parties nowadays represent the political right-wing (Eiermann, 
Mounk, & Gultchin, 2018).
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Abstract
Research on national collective narcissism, the belief and resentment that a na-
tion's exceptionality is not sufficiently recognized by others, provides a theoretical 
framework for understanding the psychological motivations behind the support for 
right-wing populism. It bridges the findings regarding the economic and sociocultural 
conditions implicated in the rise of right-wing populism and the findings regarding 
leadership processes necessary for it to find its political expression. The conditions 
are interpreted as producing violations to established expectations regarding self-
importance via the gradual repeal of the traditional criteria by which members of 
hegemonic groups evaluated their self-worth. Populist leaders propagate a social 
identity organized around the collective narcissistic resentment, enhance it, and 
propose external explanations for frustration of self and in-group-importance. This 
garners them a committed followership. Research on collective narcissism indicates 
that distress resulting from violated expectations regarding self-importance stands 
behind collective narcissism and its narrow vision of “true” national identity (the peo-
ple), rejection and hostility toward stigmatized in-group members and out-groups as 
well as the association between collective narcissism and conspiratorial thinking.
K E Y W O R D S
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Why has the essentially illiberal right-wing populism been so 
appealing? We argue that that it is because it advances a coherent 
vision of national identity that provides a convincing response to 
conditions that challenge people's established expectations regard-
ing self-importance, such as economic and sociocultural shifts that 
re-define traditional group-based hierarchies. National collective 
narcissism defines the essence of this vision. It is the belief that one's 
own group (the in-group) is exceptional and entitled to privileged 
treatment, but it is not sufficiently recognized by others. It is a pos-
itive belief about the nation laden with negative emotion of resent-
ment (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009; 
Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, & Lantos, 2019; Golec de Zavala & 
Lantos, 2020). We examine the research on conditions of populism 
and research on predictors of national collective narcissism in order 
to elucidate how violations of people's expectations regarding self-
worth and self-importance predict support for populism.
2  | WHY IS POPULISM POPUL AR?
The structural conditions facilitating support for populism have been 
grouped into two categories: cultural (“cultural backlash”) and eco-
nomic (“losers of globalization,” Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). 
The “cultural backlash” proposition claims that the post-war eco-
nomic prosperity in Western Europe brought about a cultural shift 
toward postmaterial values of self-expression, equality, and toler-
ance. It allowed relative emancipation of previously disadvantaged 
social groups such as women, ethnic, cultural, or sexual minorities, 
thus, undermining the traditional group-based hierarchies. Right 
wing populism is a counter-reaction to this shift, a “revolution in re-
verse” (Inglehart & Norris, 2017).
The evidence comes from data indicating that support for popu-
list leaders and parties is the most vigorous among members of tra-
ditionally advantaged groups: older, less-educated men representing 
ethnic and religious majorities (Inglehart & Norris, 2016, 2017). In 
addition, the lower perceived recognition from others fuels support 
for right-wing populist parties especially among non-college edu-
cated men whose status has been declining over the last 30 years 
(Gidron & Hall, 2017). Analyses show that realistic changes in a so-
ciety such as increased immigration are only predictive of right-wing 
populism via psychological investment in the view that immigration 
is problematic (Dennison, 2019), or via demographic fears over de-
creases in “White majority” (as opposed, for instance, to a realistic 
conflict view of competition over jobs, Margalit, 2019).
The “economic anxiety” or “losers of globalization” thesis argues 
that increasing economic inequalities push certain social groups to 
feel betrayed, vulnerable, and susceptible to the populist rhetoric. 
However, evidence suggests it is not the worsening of economic per-
formance or objective lack of economic means that crucially inspires 
support for populism. It is the subjective perception of one's own 
economic situation as poor or worsening relative to “the rest of soci-
ety”: the perception of unfair disadvantage in comparison to others 
(Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). Such disadvantage is particularly 
problematic where a nationally prosperous economy serves as the 
backdrop for negative self-comparisons and accentuates the threat 
of social decline (Akkerman, 2003; Burgoon, van Noort, Rooduijn, & 
Underhill, 2018a, 2018b; Engler & Weisstanner, 2019; Rooduijn, & 
Burgoon, 2018; Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012).
In support of this argument, studies indicate that high and low 
social and economic status predicts support for populism (Burgoon 
et al., 2018b; Gidron & Hall, 2017) and this relationship is com-
pounded by perceptions of relative economic disadvantage as well 
as “status anxiety,” that is, fear of losing one's relative standing 
in a social hierarchy (Jetten, 2019; Mols & Jetten, 2017; Nolan & 
Valenzuela, 2019). This is compounded by governmental failures 
in managing “economic insecurity shocks” (e.g., financial and debt 
crises; Guiso, Herrera, Morelli, & Sonno, 2019), and increasing eco-
nomic inequality which also involves middle classes lagging behind 
in the share of income growth, bolstering societal perceptions of 
status loss (Nolan & Weisstanner, 2020). Perceived economic dis-
advantage, present or future, is accompanied by negative evaluation 
of society: “collective discontent,” that is, negative evaluations of so-
ciety itself, perception that it is in decline and in peril (van der Bles, 
Postmes, LeKander-Kanis, & Otjes, 2018); “societal pessimism,” that 
is, low levels of hope in a future world, and the belief that life is 
getting worse (Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2018); “nostalgic depri-
vation,” that is, subjective perception of decline in social, economic, 
and political status (Gest, Reny, & Mayer, 2018); or “perceptions of 
anomie,” that is, perceived breakdown in the social trust, system 
legitimization, and erosion of moral standards (Heydari, Teymoori, 
Haghish, & Mohamadi, 2014; Teymoori et al., 2016).
The leitmotif in the analyses of conditions of populism outlined 
above is the observation that support for populism is inspired not 
as much by the objective changes but rather their specific interpre-
tation as threat of losing established grounds for favorable compar-
isons with others that once fueled an individual sense of importance 
(see Gidron & Hall, 2019; also e.g., Diemer, Mistry, Wadsworth, 
López, & Reimers, 2013, on the importance of using objective and 
subjective measures of social status in psychological research). This 
interpretation is produced by political leaders who create, shape, 
and manage a sense of social identity around it (Hogg, 2001; Reicher 
& Hopkins, 2001).
Analyses suggest, for example, that populist leaders reinterpret 
even economic prosperity in a way that inspires perception of rela-
tive deprivation among the advantaged groups. Specifically, analyses 
of right-wing populists speeches in economically prosperous coun-
tries (Australia, Netherlands) indicate that the country's economic 
prosperity is portrayed as not sufficiently benefiting the “ordinary 
people” (the in-group defined by populists) but the minorities that 
demand more than they deserve, corrupt “elites,” fortune seeking 
immigrants and liberals who betray traditional moral values (and are 
excluded from the in-group defined by populists). Thus, the “true” 
in-group is threatened to become “second-class citizens in their own 
country” (Mols & Jetten, 2016). Moreover, when in power populist 
parties adopt policies of “welfare chauvinism,” where welfare con-
cessions are made to a core male workforce able to show a reliable 
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employment record, but welfare cuts are made to institutions which 
traditionally supply worker representation (Unions, labor move-
ments) and nonpaternalistic economic policy support (e.g., progres-
sive taxation). Those cuts are justified on the grounds of preventing 
“scroungers” or “economic migrants” exploiting the system. However, 
ultimately, this undermines the potential for solidarity among lower 
earners, and consolidates right-wing populists' power (Mosimann, 
Rennwald, & Zimmermann, 2019; Rathgeb, 2020).
Analyses of conditions of the recent wave of right-wing popu-
lism reviewed above suggest that despite its overt claims, populism 
is not about social justice and equality, but rather about entitlement 
and protection or achievement of privilege. Detailed analyses of the 
content of this message support this conclusion, as turned to below.
3  | THE POPULIST MESSAGE
Populist leaders take advantage of “reservoirs of discontent” created 
by the conditions of populism described above (Gidron & Hall, 2019). 
Populist leaders formulate and propagate a vision of social identity 
that encompasses and validates those whose self-worth and a sense 
of self-importance is derived from external conditions undergoing 
(actual or perceived) changes. This new social identity is organized 
around shared resentment for those changes that question old di-
mensions on which people could compare themselves to others and 
feel better. It validates the resentment and makes it a defining fea-
ture of an emerging social identity. Populist rhetoric suggests that 
those who feel wronged and resentful are the righteous and the only 
“true” representatives of the nation. This rhetoric provides a coher-
ent and appealing narrative explaining why their privileged status 
was lost and how it should be restored. Thus, it offers new dimen-
sions for positive comparisons to others and the promise of restor-
ing the sense of self-importance. This promise is likely to produce 
engaged followership (Haslam & Reicher, 2017).
Populist leaders act as social identity “entrepreneurs” 
(Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2010; Mols & Jetten, 2016; Reicher & 
Haslam, 2017). They reinforce the feeling of threat to self-worth, ex-
ternalize its sources, organize the content of social identity around 
resentment and offer a vision of restoration via rejection and hos-
tility toward those––in-group and out-group members––who are 
blamed for the present decline. Populist leaders use the symbolic re-
sources available in the community to rekindle sentiments hidden in 
traditional stories about common hardship, opposition, and re-birth. 
Their narrative about the new social identity prescribes criteria to 
define those who are truly and rightfully constitutive of “the nation” 
or “the people” whom populist leaders claim to represent. Their nar-
rative also prescribes criteria for exclusion.
The stories of right-wing populism evoke the concept of 
“heartland,” an idealized conception of the nation's past (Mols 
& Jetten, 2016; Taggart, 2004; Wohl & Stefaniak, 2019) and look 
into the nation's deep-seated traditions for inclusion criteria of “na-
tional purity” (Betz, 2018). Such criteria include autochthony beliefs 
(Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Martinovic, 2015), being born in and having 
ancestry within a nation (Dunn, 2015), and following its prescribed 
traditional values (Ding & Hlavac, 2017). To be clear, the past is 
evoked selectively to divide, create the sense of threat and loss and 
scape-goat various “others” excluded from the definition of “true” 
nationals.
Populist rhetoric follows the familiar logic of a melodramatic jer-
emiad, lamentation over the lost purity of the nation, recollection of 
its greatness, and a call for its renewal combined with the unshake-
able belief that the nation is unique and chosen (Bercovitch, 1978; 
Reicher & Haslam, 2017). Jeremiad demands conversion to the 
“true” ways indicated by the self-proclaimed “chosen” who prom-
ise to lead the nation's reformation. National hardship is a con-
struction contrasted with the idealized past and the blame for the 
current deprivation and any difficulties in the process of the na-
tional re-birth is attributed to any actual or symbolic opposition 
to the self-proclaimed “true” and “better” members of the national 
group (Mudde, 2007; Müller, 2017; Sanders, Molina Hurtado, & 
Zoragastua, 2017). The populist rhetoric emphasizes the privileged 
status of those within the nation vigilant enough to see that its 
greatness is no longer recognized by others.
4  | COLLEC TIVE NARCISSISM OF THE 
POPULIST MESSAGE
Based on the above analysis, we claim that the populist rhetoric is 
constructed around national collective narcissism, the belief and re-
sentment that the in-group's exceptionality and entitlement to privi-
lege is not recognized by others. The phenomenon of collective (or 
group) narcissism was first described by scholars of the Frankfurt 
School, who analyzed the conditions and beliefs that gave rise to 
prevalent right-wing populism over 80 years ago. Those authors sug-
gested that national collective narcissism brought the Nazi regime to 
power in Germany in the 1930s (Adorno, 1997; Fromm, 1964, 1973, 
1980).
Current research links national collective narcissism to support 
for populist parties and politicians in various countries in the world 
(for meta-analysis of the relationship, see Forgas & Lantos, 2019). 
American collective narcissism was the second, after partisanship, 
strongest predictor of voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. 
Presidential election. Its role was compared to other factors, while 
explaining support for Trump's candidacy: economic dissatisfac-
tion, authoritarianism, sexism, and racial resentment. National 
collective narcissism was associated with the voters' decision to 
support Donald Trump over and above those variables (Federico 
& Golec de Zavala, 2018). In the United Kingdom, collective 
narcissism was associated with the vote to leave the European 
Union. Rejection of immigrants, perceived as a threat to economic 
superiority and the British way of life were behind the associa-
tion between collective narcissism and the Brexit vote (Golec de 
Zavala, Guerra, & Simão, 2017). In addition, collective narcissism 
predicted support for the populist government and its particular 
policies in Poland (Cislak, Wojcik, & Cichocka, 2018; Marchlewska, 
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Cichocka, Panayiotou, Castellanos, & Batayneh, 2018) and in 
Hungary (Forgas & Lantos, 2019).
Collective narcissism is not just a positive belief about one's 
own group. It is a belief that the group is unique and exceptional, 
and therefore, entitled to privileged treatment. However, even with 
the reference to a national group, collective narcissism is not sim-
ply another name for nationalism as defined and assessed in psy-
chological research (for a detailed discussion of the difference see 
Golec de Zavala, 2018; Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, et al., 2019, 
for latent factor analysis see Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2020). 
According to its definition in psychological research nationalism is 
“a perception of national superiority and an orientation toward na-
tional dominance” (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989, p. 247). Collective 
narcissism may inspire nationalism when the nation is powerful 
enough to aspire to a dominant international position but a nation 
can claim superiority based on different criteria than its relative 
power. Longitudinal research shows that collective narcissism pre-
dicts nationalism but nationalism does not predict collective narcis-
sism (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2020). What collective narcissism 
and nationalism have in common is the belief that one's own nation 
is better than other nations. However, even when collective narcis-
sism and nationalism predict similar intergroup attitudes, they do 
so for different reasons based on distinct underlying psychological 
mechanisms (Golec de Zavala, Peker, Guerra, & Baran, 2016; Golec 
de Zavala, 2020; cf. Cichocka & Cislak, 2020).
The exact reason for the narcissistic claim to the nation's excep-
tionality and entitlement vary. Not only power and relative status 
may be used to claim that the group is exceptional: its incomparable 
morality, cultural sophistication, God's love, even exceptional loss, 
suffering, and martyrdom. Accordingly, studies show that collective 
narcissism is related to glorification of national suffering and mar-
tyrdom in Hungary (Forgas & Lantos, 2019) and Poland (Skarżyńska, 
Przybyła, & Wójcik, 2012) and to militarism in the U.S. (Golec de 
Zavala et al., 2009). There is also evidence for communal collective 
narcissism that takes the in-group's benevolence, tolerance, or trust-
worthiness as the reason to claim exceptionality and entitlement to 
its privileged place among other groups (Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al., 
2019).
Whatever the reason to demand the privileged status, the 
collective narcissistic belief expresses the desire for one's own 
group to be noticeably distinguished from other groups and the 
concern that the fulfilment of this desire is threatened. Therefore, 
central to collective narcissism is the resentment that the group's 
exceptionality is not sufficiently visible to others. We argue that 
findings regarding motivational underpinnings of collective narcis-
sism can provide a theoretical framework to explain psychological 
motivations behind support for populist parties, politicians, and 
policies. Those findings provide a framework to organize research 
examining conditions of populism around the concept of violated 
expectations regarding self-importance. Research into collective 
narcissism sheds light on the motivational role of concerns regard-
ing self-importance within the processes of social identity and in-
tergroup relations.
5  | COLLEC TIVE NARCISSISM AND 
VIOL ATION OF E XPEC TATIONS REGARDING 
SELF-IMPORTANCE
Commenting on motivations behind collective narcissism 
Theodore Adorno wrote: “Collective narcissism amounts to this: in-
dividuals compensate for the consciousness of their social impotence 
(…) by making themselves, either in reality or merely in their imagina-
tions, into members of a higher, more comprehensive being. To this 
being they attribute the qualities they themselves lack, and from this 
being they receive in turn something like a vicarious participation in 
those qualities.” (Theodor Adorno, 1997, p. 114). In line with this 
quote, evidence indicates that collective narcissism is motivated 
by a combination of a belief in low self-worth and a need to assert 
narcissistic self-importance and personal significance (Golec de 
Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, et al., 2019; Jasko et al., 2020). This sug-
gests that collective narcissism is a defensive compensation for 
threatened self-importance or a projection of individual vulner-
able narcissism on collective level of self. Although collective nar-
cissism may be always present as a way of defining social identity, 
it may be marginalized and considered extremist when mainstream 
national values are liberal and democratic (Jasko et al., 2020). 
However, the conditions that threaten the sense of deservingness 
and self-importance are likely to increase the appeal of collective 
narcissism. In such conditions, collective narcissism may become a 
mainstream and normative belief about national identity.
In this vein, studies show that low self-esteem (trait, state, and 
threatened by social exclusion) reliably predicts collective narcis-
sism. Low self-esteem predicted collective narcissism in two lon-
gitudinal studies. Experimentally lowered self-esteem increased 
collective narcissism. Low self-esteem was related to various forms 
of derogation of out-groups (including social distance, hostile be-
havioral intentions, and symbolic aggression) via collective narcis-
sism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). These findings are in line with 
Theodore Adorno (1997) and Erich Fromm (1973) claims that collec-
tive narcissism compensates for narcissistic “ego fragility.” Clarifying 
what this means is important.
Collective narcissism is not an egocentric bias in perception of 
one's own group's contribution (cf. Putnam, Ross, Soter, & Roediger, 
2018; Zaromb et al., 2018). It is an emotionally laden belief about the 
in-group driven by an attempt to compensate for undermined self-im-
portance. It may inspire biased perceptions of one's own group. 
Importantly, empirical evidence indicates that collective narcissism 
neither does just express people's need to regain a sense of control,1 
nor does it express a desire for dignity, social justice, and equality; 
where all individuals have equal chances to exercise their freedom and 
feel valued (cf. Cichocka & Cislak, 2020). Frustration of those needs 
could stimulate collective actions of disadvantaged groups for recog-
nition of their identity and equal rights (e.g., Fritsche et al., 2017). 
 1Two empirical studies demonstrated that the association between personal control and 
collective narcissism found in previous studies (Cichocka et al., 2017) disappeared when 
self-esteem was taken into account as a third variable associated with personal control 
and collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019).
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Instead, collective narcissism is a belief that expresses a desire for the 
in-group's privileged position and special recognition. Such a desire is 
more likely to stimulate collective actions either to protect or to re-
verse group-based hierarchies and privilege. To illustrate the differ-
ence, collective narcissism is characteristic of the ideology of Nation 
of Islam rather than Civil Rights Movement in the USA, or Jaroslaw 
Kaczynski's divisive populism in contrast to Jacek Kuron's ideological 
work inspiring the communal spirit of the “Solidarity” in Poland in 
1980s (Kubik, 1994; Sutowski, 2018) (Figure 1).
Indeed, further evidence suggests that collective narcissism is 
associated with antagonism, support for use of violence and terror-
ism as means to assert personal significance, that is, the desire to 
matter, to “be someone,” on a collective level (Jasko et al., 2020). 
This “quest for personal significance” can be seen as a form of self-
love contingent on social recognition, which complies with the 
definition of individual narcissism (i.e., perceived self-importance 
and need for its external recognition, Crocker & Park, 2004; Morf 
& Rhodewalt, 2001). It is argued that the contents of significance 
quests (i.e., the means of achieving significance) are derived from 
social context. It is in “radical social contexts” (i.e., those that justify 
and honor violent means) that significance quests generate polit-
ical violence. A sense of personal significance loss is created by a 
perceived discrepancy between expected and experienced levels of 
positive self-evaluation, which subsequently activates significance 
quests. Moreover, significance can be also lost on a social level 
(Kruglanski et al., 2013).
Sources of collective significance loss include perceived discrim-
ination, such as Islamophobia, foreign occupation, or perceived in-
group humiliation, such as the Dutch cartoonists' depiction of the 
prophet Muhammad (Kruglanski et al., 2014). In response, social 
identity may be organized around resentment and a desire to restore 
collective significance. Extremist political ideologies offer clear cut 
programs on how to restore it (Webber et al., 2018). Indeed, Jasko 
and colleagues (2020) operationalized quest for collective signifi-
cance as collective narcissism in the context of ethnic conflict and 
found that ethnic collective narcissism was a robust predictor of 
political extremism and acceptance of terrorist violence especially 
in radical social contexts. Those studies suggest that collective nar-
cissism has less to do with assertion of self-worth as equal to others 
and more with assertion of narcissistic self-importance and personal 
entitlement as better (more righteous) than others.
In a similar vein, studies indicate that collective narcissism is 
associated with individual narcissism and especially strongly and 
consistently with its vulnerable presentation. In other words, col-
lective narcissism is associated with a frustrated demand for special 
recognition and privileged treatment (Golec de Zavala, 2018; Golec 
de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, et al., 2019). Vulnerable and grandiose 
presentations of individual narcissism differ with respect to how 
narcissistic self-importance, antagonism, and entitlement are ex-
pressed (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003; Krizan & Herlache, 2018; Miller, 
Lynam, Hyatt, & Campbell, 2017). Vulnerable narcissism is defined 
by frustration, and passive resentment in face of the lack of confir-
mation of perceived self-importance (Krizan & Herlache, 2018). It 
is characterized by a detachment from others, anger, cynical, and 
suspicious interpersonal approach (Miller et al., 2017). Grandiose 
narcissism is associated with self-enhancement, self-confidence, 
forceful assertion of self-worth, and exploitation of others (Morf, 
Horvath, & Torchetti, 2011; Roberts, Woodman, & Sedikides, 2018). 
Individual narcissism fluctuates between its grandiose and vul-
nerable forms. Vulnerable narcissism becomes salient when the 
F I G U R E  1   Motivational underpinnings 
and consequences of collective narcissism
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grandiose expectations regarding the self are not confirmed by 
external factors (Giacomin & Jordan, 2016; Kokkoris, Sedikides, & 
Kühnen, 2019).
Research shows that collective narcissism is associated with 
vulnerable and grandiose narcissism, but the latter association is 
frequently obscured by in-group satisfaction (i.e., a belief that the 
in-group is of high value and a reason to be proud, Golec de Zavala, 
Federico, et al., 2019; Leach et al., 2008) that overlaps with collec-
tive narcissism. An experimentally provoked increase in collective 
narcissism increases vulnerable narcissism. Additionally, the asso-
ciation between vulnerable and collective narcissism is reciprocal. 
Vulnerable narcissism predicts higher collective narcissism several 
weeks later and endorsing collective narcissism predicts an in-
crease in vulnerable narcissism several weeks later (Golec de Zavala, 
Dyduch-Hazar & Lantos, 2019). This suggests that investing frus-
trated self-importance in collective narcissism is futile and, indeed, 
damaging. Instead of providing relief, it fuels a self-reinforcing mech-
anism via which frustrated deservingness at the individual level of 
the self becomes implicated in the definition of social identity, and 
thus, in intergroup relations. Addressing violated expectations re-
garding self-worth by believing the in-group is entitled to privileged 
treatment, but constantly undermined by others, only increases 
rather than alleviate the aggravation for frustrated self-importance.
Violation of beliefs relevant to the self produces a motivation for 
compensatory behaviors. Those violations are encountered by mem-
bers of dominant groups threatened by the possibility of losing their 
privileged position in the group-based hierarchy, or by those whose 
privileged economic status suddenly worsens or is under threat of 
worsening. When the threatened sense of self-importance becomes 
tied to the belief about exceptionality of the in-group, it cannot be 
separated from it. The sharing of resentment for the lack of self-rec-
ognition with others validates this resentment. Populist leaders 
mobilize followers by organizing a sense of social identity around 
it. Violation of any held belief produces an aversive arousal and a 
need to reduce it. Collective sharing of such violated held belief only 
magnifies this need. The efforts to address it and reduce the arousal 
are also collectively shared.
A convergent body of findings indicate that the efforts to assert 
social identity defined by collective narcissism include intergroup 
hostility and internal tensions as well as support for policies and 
actions that, while asserting a social identity, harm the group's wel-
fare. This involves the rejection and derogation of national in-group 
members who do not conform to a narrowly construed social iden-
tity (Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, et al., 2019).
For example, in Poland, national collective narcissism predicts 
exclusion of the in-group members who are perceived as less proto-
typical or “contaminating” the national identity defined by collective 
narcissism. Polish collective narcissists reject Polish homosexuals. 
Collective narcissism is related to over-exclusion of homosexual 
co-nationals because it is associated with the belief that homosex-
uality is a threat to national values (defined by teachings of tradi-
tional Catholicism, Golec de Zavala, Mole, & Lantos, 2020; Mole, 
Golec de Zavala, & Adraq, 2020) and “contamination” of national 
identity. Polish collective narcissism is also associated with sexism 
(among men and women) driven by the belief that the traditional 
gender hierarchy expressed national values and questioning of 
those hierarchies threatens national identity (Golec de Zavala & 
Bierwiaczonek, 2020). In this way, collective narcissism is related to 
a motivation to maintain a specific in-group prototype (e.g., Pinto, 
Marques, & Paez, 2016).
National collective narcissism harms the nation not only by in-
tensifying internal divisions and exacerbating existing inequalities, 
it but also predicts support for policies that are harmful to the 
national in-group but serve as an expression of national identity 
defined by collective narcissism. In Poland, national collective nar-
cissism is associated with support for anti-environmental policies 
(Cislak et al., 2018) and policies that harm strategic and economic 
position of Poland (i.e., leaving the European Union; Cislak, Pyrczak, 
Mikewicz, & Cichocka, 2019). In Indonesia, national collective narcis-
sism interacted with group tightness (intolerance of deviance from 
group norms) in mediating the link between religious fundamental-
ism and extreme group behavior (willingness to die for one's group) 
(Yustisia, Putra, Kavanagh, Whitehouse, & Rufaedah, 2020).
In the intergroup context, collective narcissism predicts hostile 
intergroup attitudes and behaviors in retaliation to offences to the 
in-group's image, past and present, actual, and imagined (Golec de 
Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, et al., 2019). Importantly, collective narcis-
sism is associated with hypersensitivity to any signs the in-group is 
lacking recognition: in-group criticism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016), 
threat from hostility of other groups (Dyduch-Hazar, Mrozinski, & 
Golec de Zavala, 2019), and distinctiveness threat––the threat that 
the in-group is not recognized as unique in comparison to other 
groups (Guerra et al., 2019). Collective narcissists exaggerate such 
threats and interpret them as a provocation to which they respond 
aggressively.
Another line of research exemplifies the same mechanism in a 
different way. It pertains to a robust relationship between collec-
tive narcissism and conspiratorial thinking (for a review see Golec 
de Zavala, 2020). We argue that conspiracy theories and conspirato-
rial thinking satisfy the motivational state associated with collective 
narcissism, which arises from the violated expectations regarding 
self-importance.
6  | FAKE NE WS, CONSPIR ACIES ,  AND 
NATIONAL COLLEC TIVE NARCISSISM
One visible feature of the current wave of populism, relevant to 
our interpretation of conditions that inspire collective narcissism 
as violation of expectations regarding self-importance, is the in-
creased presence of fake news and conspiratorial ideation in public 
discourses. Conspiracy theories are explanations for events that—
typically without evidence— assume secretive, malevolent plots in-
volving multiple actors: a mysterious “them” who “run” things and 
work against “us” (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; 
Goertzel, 1994; van Prooijen & van Lange, 2014). People who hold 
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populist views proclaim limited faith in logic, empirical evidence, and 
scientific experts. Instead, they believe in conspiracy theories, often 
contradicted by science and evidence (e.g., that man-made global 
warming is a hoax). More generally, they believe that a single group 
of people secretly controls events, and together, rules the world 
(Lewis, Boseley, & Duncan, 2019).
Despite their varied content, a propensity to believe in specific 
conspiracy theories seems to be driven by the same generic ten-
dency to form suspicions about malevolent collective agents intend-
ing to harm and undermine “us” (e.g., generic conspiracist beliefs, 
Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013; conspiratory mindset, Imhoff 
& Bruder, 2014; conspiratorial predispositions, Uscinski, Klofstad, 
& Atkinson, 2016). Indeed, evidence suggests that a belief in one 
conspiracy theory is correlated with a belief in other conspiracy the-
ories, even if their contents vary considerably. Supporters of popu-
list political movements tend to be generally gullible, and believe in 
various conspiracy theories at the same time––even contradictory 
ones (van Prooijen, 2018).
Collective narcissism is a reliable and robust predictor of the 
belief in specific conspiracy theories and a general conspiratorial 
thinking (for review see Douglas, Sutton, & Cichocka, 2017; Golec 
de Zavala, in press). For example, Polish collective narcissism is as-
sociated with a conspiracy stereotype of the Jewish minority, which 
portrays this ethnic group as dangerous, motivated by a common 
intention to dominate the world, which is executed by indirect 
and deceptive methods, in hidden and nonobvious ways (Golec de 
Zavala & Cichocka, 2012). Polish collective narcissism is also associ-
ated with the belief that Western countries conspired to undermine 
the significance of Poland as a major contributor to the collapse of 
the Eastern European communist regimes. It also predicts the be-
lief in Russian secretive involvement in the “Smoleńsk tragedy”: The 
2010 crash of the Polish presidential plane on the way to Smoleńsk, 
Russia, which killed the president and 95 prominent Polish politicians 
on their way to commemorate Polish officers killed in Russia during 
World War II (Cichocka, Marchlewska, & Golec de Zavala, 2015; 
Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala, & Olechowski, 2016). 
Catholic collective narcissism in Poland was linked to suspicions that 
gender-equality activists and academics teaching gender studies 
secretly plot to harm and undermine traditional Catholic family val-
ues and social arrangements inspired by those values (Marchlewska, 
Cichocka, Łozowski, Górska, & Winiewski, 2019).
Research indicates that collective narcissism is associated not 
only with believing in particular conspiracy theories, but it is also 
linked to conspiratorial thinking in more general terms, an essentially 
content-free tendency to believe in secretive plots against “us.” A 
recent investigation in the United States found that collective narcis-
sism predicted an increase in content general conspiratorial thinking 
over the course of the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, which ex-
posed the public to many instances of conspiracist ideation (Golec 
de Zavala & Federico, 2018). Conspiracy beliefs about the malicious 
plotting of other groups against one's own group may fit the general 
tendency associated with collective narcissism, to adopt a posture 
of intergroup hostility across multiple intergroup distinctions. Such 
thinking provides a focused, simple explanation for why others fail to 
acknowledge the nation's uniqueness. It justifies constant vigilance 
to threats to the nation's exceptionality and provides a reassurance 
that the nation is important enough to attract secretive plots from 
others (Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018).
More generally, the robust association between collective narcis-
sism and conspiratorial thinking reflects a motivation to compensate 
for violations of the belief in one's own and the in-group's exception-
ality. As previously indicated, findings suggest that collective narcis-
sism may be underpinned by the motivation to reduce the aversive 
arousal resulting from violations of the beliefs regarding self-impor-
tance. Such violations, as violations of any held belief produce a neg-
ative arousal and a motivation to reduce it (Proulx & Heine, 2009). 
Compensation of this state can be executed in several different 
ways. One way is assimilation or changing the meaning of the discon-
firming experience to better fit the existing belief. Another way is 
accommodation, which comprises changing the committed belief to 
account for the disconfirming experience (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). 
Assimilation and accommodation often work together: both the in-
coming information and existing belief are changed to some extent, 
so the threatened belief remains unchanged.
Studies suggest that collective narcissism is associated with 
 assimilation efforts to protect the threatened self- and in-group- 
importance. Collective narcissism is related to a tendency to ex-
aggerate threat to the in-group and its image and to treat it as a 
malicious provocation (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016), to attributing 
hostile intentions toward the in-group to members of other groups 
(Dyduch-Hazar et al., 2019), including intentions executed in secre-
tive ways (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012). Such beliefs attribute 
the lack of recognition of the in-group's uniqueness to the hostility 
and jealousy of others. They suggest it is the group's exceptional-
ity that attracts hostile plots. They explain how the group can be at 
the same time exceptional and not appreciated by others, who envy 
its greatness. As we have proposed, conspiracy theories provide a 
simple and coherent, although biased, explanation for the apparent 
lack of recognition of the in-group's exceptionality and the sense of 
the in-group being significant enough to attract conspiracies from 
others (Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018).
Compensation for undermined beliefs can also take a form of 
affirmation of another, unrelated belief. Affirmed alternative be-
lief need not share any content with the belief that was violated. 
However, it should be coherent and abstract enough to dispel un-
certainty. Compensation for violation to committed beliefs can also 
take the form of a tendency to seek and recognize patterns. If collec-
tive narcissism is motivated by violated belief, collective narcissism 
should be associated with an increased tendency to see patterns, 
plots, and conspiracies where they do not exist. Affirmation and ab-
straction as compensation techniques explain why collective narcis-
sism is related to belief in conspiracy theories that do not have an 
obvious intergroup dimension (e.g., the beliefs that climate change 
is a hoax or gender conspiracy, Marchlewska et al., 2019) and con-
spiratorial thinking, which is a content-free meaning making activity 
(Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018). Conspiracy theories provide 
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unifying, albeit patently flawed, frameworks to interpret events that 
are otherwise difficult to connect and explain. People who hold col-
lective narcissistic beliefs are motivated to affirm such interpreta-
tions in order to address the violation of expectation regarding their 
self-worth, which is expressed on the collective level.
7  | CONCLUSION
Populist distrust in traditional political and societal elites results in a 
simplistic but moralized antagonism between “the pure people” and 
“the corrupt elites” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Müller, 2017). 
This essentially content-free dualism becomes associated with spe-
cific ideologies that give it its particular regional manifestations. 
Nowadays, populism is most often associated with right-wing ide-
ology (Mudde, 2017). Analyses suggest that the appeal of illiberal, 
right wing populism increases in conditions of perceived economic 
deprivation and in response to structural social changes toward 
greater intergroup equality. We argue that those conditions have 
a common denominator. They challenge traditional criteria against 
which people were used to evaluating their self-worth and satisfy 
their self-importance (Adorno, 1997; Fromm, 1973). Similarly, fre-
quent manifestations of populism have a common theme––the col-
lective narcissistic belief about their national group. In its essence, 
populism represents the collective narcissistic claim for privileged 
treatment of those who represent the “true” and “pure” elements of 
the nation. Collective narcissism provides a new definition of social 
identity and validation to those who demand self-recognition but 
perceive that they do not receive it.
Research indicates that national collective narcissism has an un-
dermined sense of self-importance invested in it. It is endorsed by 
people who attach their self-worth to their in-group's image when 
their expectations regarding self-recognition are violated. Through 
populist leaders those individuals gain a collective voice. But the 
attempt to address issues of violation of beliefs regarding self- 
importance via collective narcissism is futile. The link between the 
perceived lack of self-recognition and collective narcissism is recipro-
cal. The way out of the vicious circle of individual and collective nar-
cissism is most likely via the positive association between collective 
narcissism and non-narcissistic in-group satisfaction that is linked 
to high self-esteem, psychological maturity and wellbeing (Golec de 
Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, et al., 2019; Golec de Zavala & Lantos, 2020).
Populist leaders often provide conspiratorial explanations for the 
insufficient recognition of the entitled in-group. Collective narcis-
sism is associated with conspiratorial thinking because conspiracy 
theories often externalize the reasons for the lack of self-recognition. 
Additionally, when people endorse the collective narcissistic belief 
about their group, they are continuously motivated to terminate the 
unpleasant emotional state arising from the violation of committed 
beliefs, that is, the belief that the in-group is exceptional and unrec-
ognized. Violation of such held beliefs motivates individuals to affirm 
other coherent (but often unfounded) beliefs and increases general 
gullibility. Thus, the concept of collective narcissism also helps us 
to bridge populism, conspiratorial thinking and susceptibility to fake 
news. It offers a comprehensive explanation why those phenomena 
are so closely interlinked.
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